The theory of object in Kant's transcendental thought and some consequences of a deepening of this theory
Başlık çevirisi mevcut değil.
- Tez No: 368598
- Danışmanlar: PROF. DR. YALÇIN KOÇ
- Tez Türü: Doktora
- Konular: Felsefe, Philosophy
- Anahtar Kelimeler: Belirtilmemiş.
- Yıl: 2000
- Dil: İngilizce
- Üniversite: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi
- Enstitü: Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü
- Ana Bilim Dalı: Felsefe Ana Bilim Dalı
- Bilim Dalı: Belirtilmemiş.
- Sayfa Sayısı: 259
Özet
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Özet (Çeviri)
Within the scope of the First Critique, Kant's aim is to establish metaphysics as a science by' carrying out a cr itique of Pure Reason. In this respect, what is expected from Kant's transcendental thought is the constitution of the a priori objects of mathematics and physics (and particularly of mechanics) and the determination of the principles of these sciences, in accordance with the basic understanding which he adopts in relation to Intuition and Sens ibi 1 i ty, and without using a“substance”ontology or without giving rise to a necessity to perform such an ontology. Wi thin the present dissertation, we try to show that the ontological framework which Kant presents in his First Critique proves to be insufficient for enveloping the constitution and comprehension of both a priori and a posteriori objects; and furthermore, even if this framework is correctly understood and deepened as is necessary, it would not be possible to achieve the objectives set in the First Critique. While Kant can explain the constitution and comprehension of neither the a priori nor the a posteriori object, he furthermore fails to clarify the grounds by means of which the object is related to the discursive (impulsive) activity of Thought within his own framework. The main reason for this failure is that Kant develops his ontology indirectly by disregarding, and even in a manner deleting the transcendental acti vi ty of Reason. Kant does not even mention the transcendental activity of Reason and its relation to Imagination. We should also state that the claim that Kant's transcendental thought successfully merges rationalism with empiricism does not reflect the truth. Merging of rationalism with empiricism in fact requires a foundation of the relations between the total object and the particular a posteriori object; Kant, however, eliminates this possibility by cancelling the transcendental activity of Reason in the broadest sense. Understanding the foundations of the relation we have mentioned together with the constitution and comprehension of the total object requires the determination of the function of Reason in the constitution of the internal relations between a whole and its parts. Thinking that rationalism and empiricism are merged without considering the aforementioned is only a deed in words. Kant's most fundamental error is that he either fails to see or that he intentionally cancels the constitution and comprehension by Reason of the internal whole-part relation between the total object and the particular object and the possibility of Reason to penetrate into this internal aspect constituted as such. As a result, the nature of neither the a posteriori nor the a priori object can be understood, either within Kant's present system or by deepening this system in accordance with the principles of transcendental thought; furthermore, exclusion of the possibility of such a penetration has turned mathematics into an activity running on the external relations between a whole and its parts and consequently, the activity of thought which rests on mathematical induction and on the constitution of the correspondent-in-intuition has been basic to mathematics. Yet, what is basic to the activity of reasoning in general and of the mathematical reasoning In particular should be penetration into the internal constitution of the object. This point should not be confused with a thought like penetrating into the thing-initself. In the First Critique, Kant could not clearly put forth the distinction between the object and the correspondent-inintui tion, and he opts for including that which appears in the correspondent-in-intuition and that which is external in this respect in that which is internal by excluding that which is internal in this way. As we try to show within the present dissertation, whenever the basis of the constitution and comprehension of the total object is determined, it then is clear that that which is internal is in the grounds of the differentiating of that which is external, and that the internal appears in this sense in that which is external. However, as opposed to what Kant attempts to do, it is not possible to envelope that which is internal by starting with that which is external. Kant's analytical a posterioLi method which takes the dissection of that which is given in Intuition as the basis does not provide the constitution and comprehension of the obj ect, contrary to Kant's view. Our partial development of the ontological foundations of the a priori object by deepening the framework presented in transcendental thought without violating its main principles within the present dissertation does not furnish the answer to the question how it is possible to establish mathematics as a science, in Kant's words. Constitution of mathematics as a science is possible by a determination of the grounds of the activity of Thought which rests on the grasping and turning of the a pLiori object. Both Kant and the thinkers who follow him fail to see the possibility and the grounds of the Thought that takes the comprehension of the object as the basic, and therefore, they fail to establish a theoretical foundation for mathematics. It is obvious that transcendental thought does not furnish us with a route that yields the possibility to deepen and to eliminate the pseude-problems in this field, for such a foundation. By a deepening and a correct understanding of Kant's framework, we find the possibility of giving an interpretation to the statement known as the“Russell's Paradox”. When“Russell's Paradox”is investigated with respect to such a theory of· object, it appears that there is no paradox in the ontological sense.
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