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On the possibility of epistemic justification: A semantico-epistemic approach

Bilgisel haklı göstermenin olanaklığı üzerine: Anlam kuramsal-bilgisel bir yaklaşım

  1. Tez No: 36159
  2. Yazar: DAVİD GRÜNBERG
  3. Danışmanlar: PROF. DR. AHMET İNAM
  4. Tez Türü: Doktora
  5. Konular: Felsefe, Philosophy
  6. Anahtar Kelimeler: Transcendental Argument, Verification Principle, Semantic, Epistemic, Semantico-Epistemic, Meaning, Understanding, Truth, Epistemic Justification
  7. Yıl: 1994
  8. Dil: İngilizce
  9. Üniversite: Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi
  10. Enstitü: Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü
  11. Ana Bilim Dalı: Felsefe Ana Bilim Dalı
  12. Bilim Dalı: Belirtilmemiş.
  13. Sayfa Sayısı: 182

Özet

oz BİLGİSEL HAKLI GÖSTERMENİN OLANAKLILIGI ÜZERİNE: ANLAM KURAMSAL- BİLGİSEL BİR YAKLAŞIM GRÜNBERG, David Doktora Tezi, Felsefe Anabilim Dalı Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam Şubat, 1994, 169 sayfa. Bu tezde daâruiuksavtarının haklı gösterilmesinin olanaksız olduğunu savunanj

Özet (Çeviri)

ABSTRACT ON THE POSSIBILITY OF EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION: A SEMANT1CO-EPISTEMIC APPROACH GRÜNBERG, David Ph. D. Thesis in Philosophy Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ahmet İNAM February, 1994, 169 pages. In this dissertation the skeptical thesis that epistemic justification is impossible is taken into account. Various theories which try to refute this skeptical claim are investigated, and, as a consequence, found inadequate: Anti-skeptical views making use of transcendental arguments fail of their purpose: Those views relying on the strong verification principle involved in a transcendental argument do not work because the very principle of verification in question is not acceptable. Those views relying on the weak verification principle, on4he other hand, either do not serve their purpose, or in a very important case the verification principle in question reduces to the strong version, and thus the inadequacy thereof is demonstrated on this ground. Those views which do not make use of any verification principle whatsoever fail in giving an exact notion of“transcendental implication”, and, as a result, fail in concluding that skepticism is rebutted. Foundationalism does not work simply because the account of semantico-epistemic holism advocated in this study already implies the illegitimacy of any kind of foundationalism. Purely epistemic coherentism does not work because it fails in coping with the so-called standard objections, viz.,“input”,“plurality”, and“truth-connection”problems; whereas the idealist version thereof fails in coping with the plurality problem, and, as a consequence, with the truth-connection problem, the realist version thereof not only fails in coping with Hithe plurality problem, but also even it it were able to cope with it, it would still fail in solving the truth-connection problem. Verificationism does not work since it suggests an intolerable meaning theory. Davidsonianism, which comes very close to the semantico-epistemic holism advocated in this study, fails in that it falls short of giving a powerful philosophical account explaining the truth- conduciveness of the coherent system. On the positive part of this dissertation, it is claimed that the semantico-epistemic holism developed primarily in later Wittgensteinian lines, gets rid of exactly those difficulties that both purely epistemic coherentism and Davidsonianism encounter. First, in comparison with Davidsonianism, as to the truth of most of the beliefs presently held, the causal explanation given by Davidson is replaced by a semantical argument which in turn overcomes the disreputability of causation for philosophical explanations. Second, in comparison with purely epistemic coherentism, the semantical argument mentioned above is given as the solution of the input problem so that it does not beg the question against the epistemic skeptic. Plurality problem is transformed aX most into the presence of synchronically incommensurable systems, and thus vanished. Finally, the solution of the truth connection problem is identified with that of plurality problem, but in a way idealism is not involved.

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