Two essays on the board's uncertainty about the contracting environment and ceo compensation contracts
Başlık çevirisi mevcut değil.
- Tez No: 622336
- Danışmanlar: PROF. DR. DANIŞMAN YOK
- Tez Türü: Doktora
- Konular: Maliye, Finance
- Anahtar Kelimeler: Belirtilmemiş.
- Yıl: 2012
- Dil: İngilizce
- Üniversite: Georgia State University
- Enstitü: Yurtdışı Enstitü
- Ana Bilim Dalı: Belirtilmemiş.
- Bilim Dalı: Belirtilmemiş.
- Sayfa Sayısı: 128
Özet
Abstract: I examine the extent to which boards with expertise in related product markets, i.e., downstream (customer) or upstream (supplier) industries, delegate their monitoring and advisory functions to stock markets. Directors from related industries (DRIs) are argued to have greater access to information about the input and output product markets of the firm. This, in turn, is predicted to reduce the reliance on stockbased compensation, a costly mechanism, particularly for firms that depend more on information about product markets and whose stock prices are not very informative about product markets. The evidence documented in this paper is largely consistent with these predictions. A number of additional tests suggest that this evidence is not likely to be explained by the potential conflict of interests between the firm's stockholders and DRIs. Hence, I conclude that boards with related industry expertise delegate to stock markets to an optimally lesser extent due to their informational advantages. Essay 2: Stock-based CEO compensation following conglomerate acquisitions Abstract: I examine how stock-based incentive compensation for the CEO is designed following corporate acquisitions conditional on the economic nature of the acquisition. Large acquisitions represent significant changes in the economic environment of the firm. Furthermore, these changes are more likely to occur with conglomerate acquisitions. Accordingly, implications of the two mainstream theories of incentive compensation, i.e., efficient contracting theory and agency theory, are tested separately for conglomerate acquisitions. The empirical tests generally show that stock-based compensation is employed more intensely after conglomerate acquisitions than otherwise. Overall, the results documented in this paper seem consistent with the notion that greater economic uncertainties that are likely to follow conglomerate acquisitions induce the board to rely more heavily on stock-based incentives, an external monitoring mechanism.
Özet (Çeviri)
a
Benzer Tezler
- Eğitim ve okul yönetiminde örgütsel belirsizlikle ilgili temel konuları ele alan bilimsel yayınların analizi 1990-2016
Analysis of scientific publications addressing key issues related to organizational uncertainty in education and school management 1990-2016
MÜZEYYEN PETEK DİNÇMAN
Doktora
Türkçe
2016
Eğitim ve ÖğretimHacettepe ÜniversitesiEğitim Bilimleri Ana Bilim Dalı
YRD. DOÇ. DR. DİDEM KOŞAR
- Essays on financial intermediaries, business cycles and macroprudential policies
Başlık çevirisi yok
YASİN MİMİR
- Essays in empirical corporate finance
Ampirik kurumsal finans alanında makaleler
GÜL DEMİRTAŞ
Doktora
İngilizce
2014
İşletmeSabancı ÜniversitesiYönetim Bilimleri Ana Bilim Dalı
YRD. DOÇ. DR. ŞERİF AZİZ ŞİMŞİR
- Dijitalleşme bağlamında yeni medya ve seçmen davranışı ilişkisi: 23 Haziran 2019 yerel seçimleri Küçükçekmece ve Bağcılar örnekleri
New media and voter behavior relationship in the context of digitalization: 23 June 2019 local elections examples of Küçükçekmece and Bağcılar districts
NECMETTİN MUTLU
Doktora
Türkçe
2020
Siyasal Bilimlerİstanbul Gelişim ÜniversitesiSiyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Ana Bilim Dalı
PROF. DR. NAİL ÖZTAŞ