Essays in game theory and bankruptcy
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- Tez No: 758664
- Danışmanlar: Belirtilmemiş.
- Tez Türü: Doktora
- Konular: Ekonomi, Maliye, Economics, Finance
- Anahtar Kelimeler: Belirtilmemiş.
- Yıl: 2015
- Dil: İngilizce
- Üniversite: The University of Edinburgh
- Enstitü: Yurtdışı Enstitü
- Ana Bilim Dalı: Belirtilmemiş.
- Bilim Dalı: Belirtilmemiş.
- Sayfa Sayısı: 62
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Özet (Çeviri)
In Chapter 1 I study the iterative strategy elimination mechanisms for normal form games. The literature is mostly clustered around the order of elimination. The conventional elimination also requires more strict knowledge assumptions if the elimination is iterative. I define an elimination process which requires weaker rationality. I establish some preliminary results suggesting that my mechanism is order independent whenever iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies (IEWDS) is so. I also specify conditions under which the“undercutting problem”occurs. Comparison of other elimination mechanisms in the literature (Iterated Weak Strategy Elimination, Iterated Strict Strategy Elimination, Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion, RBEU, Dekel-Fudenberg Procedure, AsheimDufwenberg Procedure) and mine is also studied to some extent. In Chapter 2 I study the axiomatic characterization of a well-known bankruptcy rule: Proportional Division (PROP). The rule allocates shares proportional to agents' claims and hence, is intuitive according to many authors. I give supporting evidence to this opinion by first defining a new type of consistency requirement, i.e. union−consistency and showing that PROP is the only rule that satisfies anonymity, continuity and union−consistency. Note that anonymity and continuity are very general requirements and satisfied by almost all the rules that have been studied in this literature. Thus, I prove that we can choose a unique rule among them by only requiring union−consistency. Then, I define a bankruptcy operator and give some intuition on it. A bankruptcy operator is a mapping from 4 the set of bankruptcy operators to itself. I prove that any rule will converge to PROP under this operator as the claims increase. I show nice characteristics of the operator some of which are related to PROP. I also give a definition for continuity of an operator. In Chapter 3 investigate risk-averse investors' behaviour towards a risky firm. In order to find Pareto Optimal allocations regarding a joint venture, I employ a 2-stage game, first stage of which involves a social-planner committing to an ex-post bankruptcy rule. A bankruptcy rule is a set of suggestions for solving each possible bankruptcy problem. A bankruptcy problem occurs when there is not enough endowment to allocate to the agents each of whom has a claim on it. I devise the game-theoretic approach posed in Kıbrıs and Kıbrıs (2013) and extend it further. In fact, that paper considers a comparison among 4 renowned bankruptcy rules whereas mine do not restrict attention to any particular rule but rather aim to find a Pareto Optimal(PO) one. I start with 2 agent case in order to give some insight to the reader and then, generalise the results to an arbitrary number of investors. I find socially desirable (PO) allocations and show that the same can be achieved through financial markets by the help of some well-known results.
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