Geri Dön

Political moral hazard

Başlık çevirisi mevcut değil.

  1. Tez No: 400390
  2. Yazar: M. KADİR DOĞAN
  3. Danışmanlar: PROF. DR. CHRISTOPHE CHAMLEY
  4. Tez Türü: Doktora
  5. Konular: Ekonomi, Economics
  6. Anahtar Kelimeler: Belirtilmemiş.
  7. Yıl: 2006
  8. Dil: İngilizce
  9. Üniversite: Boston University
  10. Enstitü: Yurtdışı Enstitü
  11. Ana Bilim Dalı: Ekonomi Ana Bilim Dalı
  12. Bilim Dalı: Belirtilmemiş.
  13. Sayfa Sayısı: 95

Özet

Özet yok.

Özet (Çeviri)

This dissertation is composed of three chapters on the subject of moral hazard in the socialand political sphere.The rst chapter explores the eects of asymmetric information on the public control ofpoliticians in a world where the politicians? pre?election promises are not credible. Politiciansmake decisions that aect social welfare. Some of these decisions are observable by thepublic and some are not. We study a model with identical politicians and a representativevoter whose interests conict with those of the politicians. The voter?s decision to re?electthe politician depends on both her welfare and the observable decisions of the politician.In equilibrium, either socially optimal decisions are not taken by the politician or if taken,the politician would extract more rent in each period. In the latter case, politicians are alsoreplaced more frequently. We show that a reform that would make the political systemmore transparent should be supported by the public and may also be welcomed by thepolitician.The second chapter analyzes the relation between political accountability and the size ofprovinces. We study a model in which the signal to the electorate about the politician?sdecision is noisier in more highly populated provinces. The model implies that both theequilibrium re?election probabilities of politicians and political accountability are lowerin highly populated provinces. This prediction of the model is tested on panel data ofnine municipal elections for 81 provinces of Turkey in the period 1963-2004. We nd thatprovince size is negatively associated with political accountability.In the third chapter, we examine the eects of the introduction of restrictions on the statementof preferences in a two?sided matching model with incomplete information. Themodel is similar to the process used for college admissions in Turkey. Colleges have unanimouspreferences ? students with higher ranking in the national examinations are alwayspreferred. We show that the introduction of the restrictions on statement of students?preferences can result in unstable matching between colleges and students.

Benzer Tezler

  1. Küreselleşme sürecinde finansal krizler ve kamu borç stoku ilişkisi: Türkiye örneği

    Financial crisis in the process of globalization and relation of public dept stock: Turkey as example

    ÖZGÜR BALMUMCU

    Yüksek Lisans

    Türkçe

    Türkçe

    2006

    EkonometriMuğla Üniversitesi

    İktisat Ana Bilim Dalı

    PROF.DR. CEMİL ERTUĞRUL

  2. Finansal krizler ve İMF'nin kriz politikaları

    Financial crises and IMF-crise policies

    NURGÜN TOPALLI

    Yüksek Lisans

    Türkçe

    Türkçe

    2006

    EkonomiErciyes Üniversitesi

    İktisat Ana Bilim Dalı

    DOÇ.DR. EMİNE BİLGİLİ

  3. Mali liberalizasyon ve krizler ile banka gözetim-denetiminde 90 sonrası yeni trendler

    Başlık çevirisi yok

    OKTAY DURSUN

    Yüksek Lisans

    Türkçe

    Türkçe

    2000

    EkonomiYıldız Teknik Üniversitesi

    İktisat Ana Bilim Dalı

    PROF. DR. MEHMET SÜMER

  4. Türkiye'de ve Dünya'da mevduat sigorta sistemi

    Deposit protection system in Turkey and in the world

    ÖZGÜR DÖKDÖK

    Yüksek Lisans

    Türkçe

    Türkçe

    2002

    BankacılıkMarmara Üniversitesi

    Bankacılık Ana Bilim Dalı

    DOÇ. DR. SUNA OKSAY

  5. Negotiating the norms of consumption: An exploration of ordinary practices of disposing

    Tüketimle uzlaşma: Elden çıkartma pratikleri üzerine bir araştırma

    MELTEM TÜRE

    Doktora

    İngilizce

    İngilizce

    2013

    İşletmeİhsan Doğramacı Bilkent Üniversitesi

    İşletme Ana Bilim Dalı

    PROF. DR. GÜLİZ GER