F. H. Bradley metafiziği
Başlık çevirisi mevcut değil.
- Tez No: 41540
- Danışmanlar: PROF. DR. KENAN GÜRSOY
- Tez Türü: Doktora
- Konular: Felsefe, Philosophy
- Anahtar Kelimeler: Belirtilmemiş.
- Yıl: 1995
- Dil: Türkçe
- Üniversite: Ankara Üniversitesi
- Enstitü: Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü
- Ana Bilim Dalı: Felsefe Ana Bilim Dalı
- Bilim Dalı: Belirtilmemiş.
- Sayfa Sayısı: 216
Özet
Özet yok.
Özet (Çeviri)
The latest, and perhaps we may venture to say the most important, statement of Absolute Idealism in English philosophy is that of F.H. Bradley who, in his Appearance and Reality (1893) offers an interpretation of the theory which differs materially from that of his predecessors. Bradley defined metaphysics, as“the study of first principles or ultimate truths, or again the effort to comprehend the universe, not simply piecemeal or by fragments, but somehow as a whole”. As Berkeley claimed that“to be is to be perceived”, so Bradley insisted that“anything in no sense felt or experienced, become to me quite meaning.”Bradley approaches his task armed with a chief principle of whose validity he is completely convinced. Thinking, he says, means the acceptance of a certain standart, and that standart, in any case, is an assumption as to the character of reality. Ultimate Reality, he says, is such that it does not contradict itself, here is an absolute criterion. He, then, proceeds to apply this“absolute criterion”in its negative form to our various ordinary ideas about the world, that is, our various ways of regarding reality, and finds that it proves them all to be self-contradictory and, therefore, not real, but only“appearance”. Such ideas include those of qualities and relations, space and time, primary and secondary qualities, substance, self, cause, change, motion and nature. Though Bradley argues that all these ideas, because inconsistent and unintelligible, can only give us appearance and not reality, he emphasises that these appearances certainly exist. Nothing, he stresses, is actually removed from existence by being labelled“appearance”. It is clear from this that Bradley does not mean by calling anything, for example time, space, relations, etc.,“unreal”that it does not exist. He uses“real”in an abnormal way to mean what is rational, self-consistent, coherent, harmonious and all- inclusive. Anything which fall shorts of this is“unreal”and mere appearance.205 Appearance is only intelligible as an appearance of the Real. To think of some thing as merely an appearance is to think of it as ultimately adjectival : and the adjective implies a substantive. If there were no reality, there could be no appearance. All appearances have degrees of reality; but some are more real than others. Appearance cannot be reality, but, since appearances certainly exist, they must be related in some way to the real. Reality is present among its appearances in different degrees and with different values. Bradley insists that Reality, or Absolute,-is nothing apart from appearances; it "appears in its appearances and they are its revelation. How this harmonising and transforming of discrepant elements takes place, Bradley confesses he does not know, but insists that it is possible and necessary and therefore is so. We cannot understand how in the Absolute a rich harmony embraces every special discord. But, on the other hand, we may be sure that this result is reached. We do not know how all these partial unites come together in the absolute, but we may be sure that the content of not one is obliterated. Reality, as well as being rational, coherent, all-inclusive, harmonious, non- contradictory and containing all its appearances, must be supra-relational, and therefore, one. Knowledge of this Reality-this Absolute, as Mr. Bradley delights to call it-we can never obtain, for to know the Absolute at once implies that distinction between knower and known which cannot belong to the real. To know the Absolute I should have to be the Absolute. And even then I could not know myself, for even in self knowledge a relation breaks out again-the fatal Dualism which we want to get rid of; the distinction between knower and known, between part and Whole, which implies a relation between them. This thesis-that Reality cannot be fully known or thought-is defended by an elaborate attempt to show that all the categories of our thought imply incoherences or contradictions, inconsistencies which we cannot suppose to belong to Reality.
Benzer Tezler
- Josiah Royce'un metafiziği
Josi̇ah Royce's metaphysi̇cs
BAHTİNUR MÖNGÜ
Doktora
Türkçe
2014
FelsefeAtatürk ÜniversitesiFelsefe Ana Bilim Dalı
PROF. DR. MUSTAFA YILDIRIM
YRD. DOÇ. DR. ÖNDER BİLGİN
- Anyonik reaktiflerin sepiyolit tarafından adsorplanma mekanizması
Başlık çevirisi yok
MUSTAFA ÇINAR
Yüksek Lisans
Türkçe
1998
Maden Mühendisliği ve Madencilikİstanbul Teknik ÜniversitesiMaden Mühendisliği Ana Bilim Dalı
PROF. DR. MEHMET SABRİ ÇELİK
- Serum albumin ve globulin franksiyonlarındaki lipoproteinlere bağlı kolesterol düzeylerinin belirtimi
Başlık çevirisi yok
F. H. TUBA ARABACIOĞLU
- 27 numaralı Ayntâb Şer'îyye Sicilinin transkripsiyonu ve değerlendirilmesi (H.1076-1077/M.1666-1667)
The transcription and evaluation of Ayntab Sheria Record/Registry numbered 27 (H.1076-1077/AD.1666-1667)
BÜŞRA CANPOLAT
Yüksek Lisans
Türkçe
2021
TarihGaziantep ÜniversitesiTarih Ana Bilim Dalı
DR. ÖĞR. ÜYESİ MURAT ÇELİKDEMİR
