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Yolsuzluğun milletlerarası ticari tahkim anlaşmasına etkisi

The effect of corruption on international commercial arbitration agreements

  1. Tez No: 951578
  2. Yazar: KEREM KART
  3. Danışmanlar: PROF. DR. FARUK KEREM GİRAY
  4. Tez Türü: Yüksek Lisans
  5. Konular: Hukuk, Law
  6. Anahtar Kelimeler: Milletlerarası Ticari Tahkim, Yolsuzluk, Rüşvet, Yatırım Sözleşmeleri, Aracılık Sözleşmeleri, Yolsuzluğun İspatı, İspat Ölçüsü, İspat Yükü, Aleyhe Çıkarım, Kırmızı Bayraklar, Tahkime Elverişlilik, Kompetenz-Kompetenz Doktrini, Ayrılabilirlik Prensibi, Tahkim Anlaşmalarının Kapsamı, International Commercial Arbitration, Corruption, Bribery, Investment Contracts, Intermediary Contracts, Proving Corruption, Standard of Proof, Burden of Proof, Adverse Inference, Red Flags, Arbitrability, Kompetenz-Kompetenz Doctrine, Principle of Separability, Scope of the Arbitration Agreement
  7. Yıl: 2025
  8. Dil: Türkçe
  9. Üniversite: İstanbul Üniversitesi
  10. Enstitü: Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü
  11. Ana Bilim Dalı: Milletlerarası Özel Hukuk Ana Bilim Dalı
  12. Bilim Dalı: Belirtilmemiş.
  13. Sayfa Sayısı: 186

Özet

Yatırım faaliyetlerinin ve ticari ilişkilerin artan bir biçimde sınır ötesi hâl aldığı günümüzde devletler, enerji kaynaklarının kullanılması, altyapı faaliyetlerinin gerçekleştirilmesi ve çevrenin korunması gibi çok çeşitli kamu hizmetlerini gerçekleştirmek üzere yabancı yatırımcılarla yatırım sözleşmeleri akdetmektedirler. Bu sözleşmelerin bazen rüşvet, irtikâp veya nüfuz ticareti gibi yolsuzluk fiillerine dayanarak kurulduğu görülmektedir. Bu durumda yabancı yatırımcı, genellikle yatırım sözleşmesini akdetmek istediği ülkedeki kamu görevlilerinin kararlarını etkileme nüfuzuna sahip üçüncü bir kişiyle konusu nüfuz ticareti teşkil eden bir aracılık sözleşmesi akdetmektedir. Aracı konumunda olan söz konusu üçüncü kişi ise kamu görevlilerine rüşvet vererek ilgili yatırım sözleşmesinin yabancı yatırımcıyla yapılmasını sağlamaktadır. Çoğu zaman taraflar, hem konusu yolsuzluk teşkil eden aracılık sözleşmelerinde hem de yolsuzluk yoluyla elde edilen yatırım sözleşmelerinde bir milletlerarası ticari tahkim şartına yer vermektedirler. Herhangi bir sebeple söz konusu sözleşmelerden kaynaklanan bir uyuşmazlığın ortaya çıkması hâlinde ise çalışmamızın konusunu oluşturan şu soru gündeme gelmektedir: Yolsuzluğun milletlerarası ticari tahkim şartına etkisi nedir? Çalışmamızda bu temel soruna cevap aranırken birinci bölümde yolsuzluk kavramı açıklanmış, milletlerarası ticari tahkimde sıklıkla karşılaşılan yolsuzluk teşkil eden fiiller sayılmış, yolsuzluk içeren sözleşmeler sınıflandırılmış, bu sözleşmelere uygulanacak hukuk ve sözleşmelerinin geçerliliği değerlendirilmiştir. İkinci bölümde, yolsuzluğun ispatı konusunda geliştirilen, analitik, adil ve tatmin edici sonuçlar sağlayacağı ve yargılamanın öngörülebilirliği ile tutarlılığını tesis edeceği düşünülen yolsuzluk hâlinde kural (yasal) ispat ölçüsünün yukarı çekilmesi, ispat yükünün farklı uygulanarak delil sunamayan taraf hakkında aleyhe çıkarımlar yapılması ve yolsuzluk teşkil eden bir eylemin gerçekleştiğine dair olası bir riske işaret eden kırmızı bayraklarla ispatın gerçekleştirilmesi şeklindeki yöntemlerden bahsedilmiştir. Üçüncü bölümde ise yolsuzluğun tahkim şartına etkisi; tahkime elverişlilik, kompetenz-kompetenz doktrini, ayrılabilirlik prensibi ve tahkim anlaşmasının kapsamı çerçevesinde ele alınmıştır.

Özet (Çeviri)

Due to the increasingly cross-border nature of investment activities and trade relations, states enter into investment contracts with foreign investors to provide a wide range of public services such as energy exploitation, infrastructure development, and environmental protection. These contracts are sometimes procured through corrupt means. In such cases, the foreign investor typically concludes an intermediary contract -amounting to trading in influence- with a third party who has the ability to influence the decisions of public officials in the host country. The third party, acting as an intermediary, bribes public officials to ensure that the investment contract is awarded to the foreign investor. It is common for parties to include an international commercial arbitration clause in both intermediary and investment contracts. When a dispute arises under these contracts, the following key question emerges, forming the subject of this thesis: What is the effect of corruption on the international commercial arbitration clause? To answer this question, the first chapter explores the concept of corruption, categorizes corrupt practices frequently encountered in international commercial arbitration, classifies corrupt contracts, examines the law applicable to them, and discusses their validity. In the first chapter, rather than providing a general definition, corruption is examined through acts commonly encountered in arbitration: bribery, extortion, and trading in influence. These acts manifest in contracts that provide for corruption (e.g., intermediary contracts) and contracts procured through corruption (e.g., investment contracts). The determination of whether a contract is tainted by corruption is first governed by the law applicable to the contract, chosen by the parties or, in its absence, determined by the arbitrators. If the law applicable to a contract involving corruption differs from the law of a third state closely connected to the contract (typically the law of the place of performance), and if both the third state's law and the conflict-of-laws rules applicable to the arbitration allow it, the mandatory rules of that third state should apply. Furthermore, since the prevention of corruption involving public officials is considered part of international public policy, this policy applies and should apply to these contracts. Even in the absence of any allegation by the parties, arbitrators must investigate potential corruption ex officio, as required by international public policy. As the nullity of unlawful and immoral contracts is a universally recognized legal principle, contracts providing for corruption are considered void under most legal systems. However, the validity of contracts procured by corruption remains a matter of debate. In this regard, three main approaches exist. The first holds that such contracts are always void. The second considers them voidable at the discretion of the aggrieved party. The third deems them valid but allows for alternative remedies such as damages or a reduction in the contract price. Based on international instruments, particularly the express provision in article 8(2) of the Civil Law Convention on Corruption and Swiss practice, this thesis argues that under Turkish law, such contracts should be regarded as voidable. The second chapter examines the methods developed to prove corruption in arbitration, with the aim of ensuring fair and predictable outcomes. These methods include raising the standard of proof, adjusting the application of the burden of proof, drawing adverse inferences, and using“red flags”as indicators of suspicious conduct. Arbitrators tend to apply a higher standard of proof in corruption cases due to the influence of Anglo-American and Anglo-Saxon legal systems on international commercial arbitration. However, since corruption is inherently difficult to prove and this difficulty is further heightened in the context of international arbitration, a practice has emerged whereby arbitrators may shift the burden of production, one of the two components of the burden of proof. If certain red flags are present, arbitrators may require the opposing party to submit evidence rebutting the allegations of corruption. Failure to do so may lead to adverse inferences being drawn against that party. The adverse inference, which logically follows from the shifting of the burden of production, is the conclusion that the withheld evidence would have been detrimental to the interests of the party possessing it. When the party alleging corruption provides prima facie evidence that does not fully meet the required standard of proof, or when such evidence is available on record, the arbitral tribunal may, either at the claimant's request or ex officio, draw an adverse inference and conclude that corruption occurred. In international arbitration, the drawing of adverse inferences in corruption cases typically requires the presence of red flags. To ensure the effective use of red flags in corruption-related disputes, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has developed a three-stage methodology. The first stage involves identifying potential red flags; the second, verifying each individual red flag; and the third, conducting a comprehensive evaluation. The application of this method often leads to the conclusion that many red flags constitute circumstantial evidence. In certain cases, however, red flags may also be accepted as direct evidence. The third chapter analyzes the effect of corruption on the arbitration clause through the lenses of arbitrability, the doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz, the principle of separability, and the scope of the arbitration agreement. Despite the divergent decisions of Pakistani courts regarding arbitrability, it is now widely accepted under most national legal systems that civil claims arising from corruption or similar unlawful acts are capable of settlement by arbitration. When allegations of corruption are directed solely at the investment or intermediary contract (i.e., the main contract), or when both the main contract and the arbitration clause are alleged to be tainted by corruption, courts generally apply the principle of separability, uphold the validity of the arbitration agreement, and refer the dispute to arbitration in accordance with the doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz. Conversely, where the allegations of corruption are directed specifically at the arbitration clause itself, the predominant view is that, contrary to the kompetenz-kompetenz doctrine, national courts should determine whether a valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties. Disputes arising out of corrupt intermediary contracts are not within the scope of the arbitration agreement, as the parties lack genuine consent to arbitrate disputes stemming from a criminal agreement between them. Accordingly, such disputes should be resolved by state courts, even if the contract contains an arbitration clause. By contrast, disputes involving corruption are covered by the arbitration clause in investment contracts procured by corruption. Therefore, such disputes may be resolved before an arbitrator.

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